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Abstract
Many decisions are made in environments where outcomes are de-
termined by the realization of multiple random events. A decision
maker may be uncertain how these events are related. We identify
and experimentally substantiate behavior that intuitively reects a
lack of condence in their joint distribution. Our ndings suggest a
dimension of ambiguity which is di¤erent from that in the classical
distinction between risk and Knightian uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
Individuals often make decisions when there is limited information about the
stochastic environment and hence where there may be incomplete condence
that any single given probability law accurately describes it. Ellsberg (1961)
identies behavior that intuitively reects such a lack of condence, and
shows thereby that the distinction between risk (where information is perfect
and condence is complete) and ambiguity is empirically meaningful. This
paper considers a setting where uncertainty is generated by the realization
of multiple random events and we study ambiguity about how these random
events di¤er or are related to one another. Paralleling Ellsberg, we identify
behavior that intuitively reects a lack of condence in (or uncertainty about)
their joint distribution. Then we conduct a controlled incentivized laboratory
experiment the results of which support the empirical signicance of this new
dimension of ambiguity.
In Ellsbergs (1961) classic two-urn thought experiment, there are two
urns, each containing 100 balls that are either red or black. You are told
the exact color composition for one (50-50), the risky urn, and nothing at
all about the composition of the other one, the ambiguous urn. Intuition
suggests, and many subsequent laboratory experiments conrm, that many
people prefer to bet on drawing red (black, respectively) from the risky urn
as opposed to from the ambiguous urn, thereby demonstrating a behavioral
distinction between risk (known composition) and Knightian uncertainty (un-
known bias or composition).
We consider a setting where there are two urns and you are told the same
about the composition of each, so that you have no reason to distinguish
between them. However, you are told very little; for example, only that each
urn contains two balls each of which is either red or black. Accordingly, you
are not given any reason to be certain that the compositions are identical, nor
are you given any reason for being condent that the urnscompositions are
unrelated or related in any particular way. We study choices between bets
on the colors of two balls, where simultaneously one ball is drawn from each
urn, and we identify behavior that intuitively reveals a lack of condence
concerning the relation between the urns. The key idea is that ambiguity
about how the compositions of the two urns might di¤er or be related is
not relevant to bets on a single urn. This leads us to focus on the choice
between bets on the color of the ball drawn from one urn versus bets on
the colors of the balls drawn from both urns (specically, on whether the
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two balls have the same color, or whether they have di¤erent colors). The
behavior we identify is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment
which provides evidence of sensitivity to the lack of information concerning
the relation between the urnscompositions. By considering also bets on an
urn known to contain an equal number of red and black balls, we nd that
this new form of ambiguity aversion is only partially related to Knightian
ambiguity aversion as measured in Ellsbergs experiment, and we study at
a behavioral level the three-fold distinction between risk, uncertain bias (or
composition) and the uncertain relation between biases.
The experimental design developed to study these preferences identies
strict preference using pairwise choices between bets. To check the robustness
of the results, we also employ standard choice lists that elicit an approxima-
tion to the certainty equivalent of each bet.
The preceding summarizes the main contributions of the paper: high-
lighting ambiguity about correlation and providing supporting experimental
evidence. The potential relevance for economic applications is addressed next
in this introduction (and also in the concluding section). Our thought exper-
iment is described in Section 2, and the following two sections describe the
experimental implementation and results. Section 5 turns to the question of
how to model the observed behavior. Finally, a concluding section elaborates
on the economic relevance of ambiguity about correlation and discusses some
related literature.
Economic signicance: Betting on the draws from several urns is in-
tended as a canonical example of choice problems where payo¤s to an action
depend on the (simultaneous) realization of multiple random events. A text-
book example is the choice between bets on multiple tosses of a coin of
unknown bias. Optimal portfolio choice is another important example. Here
we indicate that the behavior we identify is relevant (albeit indirectly) to the
potential gains from portfolio diversication, one of the central principles of
nancial economics, to the limited stock market participationpuzzle, and
to the pricing of idiosyncratic uncertainty in a cross-sectional setting. The
concluding section describes other motivating examples.
It is well-known (Dow andWerlang 1992) that given a safe asset and a sin-
gle uncertain stock, then nonparticipation in stocks is a knife-edge property
under subjective expected utility maximization, but that it can be robustly
optimal, (that is, optimal for a range of expected excess returns), if there
is ambiguity aversion. This begs the question whether in the more realistic
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situation where there are many uncertain assets, if diversication can dimin-
ish the e¤ect of ambiguity on participation and possibly even restore the
expected utility result asymptotically when the number of stocks is large. As
a concrete example, suppose that there are I securities available and that
the investors model of returns is a linear factor model as in arbitrage pricing
theory. That is, the ith return si takes the form
si = i X + i, i = 1; 2; :::; I;
the vector X gives factor returns and i gives the betas or factor loadings
of security i. Typically, strong assumptions on the idiosyncratic terms i are
adopted, say that they are identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.).
However, suppose that the investor is not condent that X captures all rel-
evant factors. She may not be able to identify missing factorsif she could,
then X could be expanded to include thembut she may nevertheless wish
to take into account their possible existence when choosing a portfolio. Then
there is no basis for taking a stand on how the is may di¤er or are related
across securitiesif rates of return are inuenced also by omitted factors,
then the distribution of the residuals i depends on the nature of the omit-
ted factors, which, by assumption, is poorly understood. In particular, if
the investor is sensitive to the resulting ambiguity about the di¤erences and
relation between returns, she may perceive only limited gains from diversi-
cation which may limit her degree of stock market participation. Indeed,
Epstein and Seo (2015) show, using a formal model of preference that can
accommodate the new ambiguity-sensitive behavior that is our focus here,
that the optimality of nonparticipation is robust to the presence of many
stocks even if I grows without bound. In the literature on optimal port-
folio choice, Fouque, Pun and Wong (2016), in a continuous-time model,
and Liu and Zeng (2016) and Huang, Zhang and Zhu (2017), in a static
mean-variance framework, show that limited diversication is optimal given
suitable ambiguity about the correlation of returns (see also Jiang and Tian
(2016)). Readers are referred to these papers and the references therein for
arguments that estimation of the correlation of returns can be di¢ cult, more
so than for moments associated with any single asset, thus supporting the
assumption of correlation ambiguity as opposed to correlation risk.1
1One reason cited for the di¢ culty given high-frequency data, is that because di¤erent
assets are traded at di¤erent times it is necessary to synchronize asset returns and hence
remove some data points (Ait-Sahalia et al 2010).
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There are e¤ects also on the pricing sideambiguity about how returns
are related implies that idiosyncratic uncertainty can have a positive price
in equilibrium even in the limit as I goes to innity (Epstein and Schneider
2010). Though this may strike some as contrary to the intuition based on
the classic Law of Large Numbers, the point is that the latter does not apply
when there is ambiguity about security returns (that is, of the is) of the sort
studied here (Maccheroni and Marinacci 2005).
2 A Thought Experiment
Two urns, numbered 1 and 2, each contain two balls, each of which is ei-
ther red or black; no additional information about the urnscompositions
is given.2 One ball is to be drawn from each urn simultaneously. Thus the
set of possible outcomes is fR1B2; B1R2; R1R2; B1B2g, where the characters
correspond to the color of the ball (red or black) and the subscript to the
urn (1 or 2). Its subsets are called events. Before the balls are drawn, an
individual is asked to choose between specied bets on the colors of the two
balls. Denote by R1B2 both the obvious event and the corresponding bet that
yields the (positive) prize x if that event is realized and the prize 0 otherwise;
similarly for other events and bets. Prizes are denominated in dollars. Both
the events fR1B2; R1R2g and fB1R2; B1B2g and the corresponding bets on
the color of the ball drawn from urn 1 are sometimes denoted simply R1 and
B1 respectively. Let  denote a preference relation on the set of bets.
As outlined in the introduction, our thought experiment, which we term
One vs Two, o¤ers the individual the choice between betting on the color
drawn from one urn as opposed to betting on the colors drawn from both urns.
More precisely, consider the following rankings between the bets Same =
fR1R2; B1B2g, Diff = fR1B2; B1R2g and the bets R1 and B1 on the draw
from urn 1:
R1  Same and B1  Diff . (2.1)
Why would an individual exhibit these rankings? The intuition is that
only the bets on the draws from both urns are subject to ambiguity about how
urns di¤er or are related, which may, depending on the degree of aversion to
2In Ellsbergs two-urn experiment, the individual is given di¤erent information about
the two urns. In particular, since one of the urns in that experiment has known compo-
sition, there is no scope for ambiguity about how the two compositions may be related
which is our focus here.
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such ambiguity, lead to the preference for the bets R1 and B1. To elaborate,
consider the choice between R1 and Same. Betting on the same color being
drawn from both urns is attractive if it is believed that the compositions of
the two urns are similar, which would make positive correlationbetween
the colors drawn likely. Since you are not told anything to the contrary, this
belief is plausible but no more so than the belief that the two compositions are
di¤erentone urn is biased towards red and the other towards blackwhich
would make negative correlation between the colors drawn more likely
and render Same an unattractive bet. Given a conservative attitude, this
uncertainty would act against choosing Same. Of course, there is also reason
for a conservative individual to discount the bet R1 because the composition
of each urn is ambiguous. Conclude that a preference for R1 may arise if
there is greater aversion to ambiguity about the relation between urns than
to ambiguity about the bias of (the rst urn and hence, presumably) any
single urn.
A simpler rationale for a strict preference for R1 is that the individual
believes that the rst urn has many more red than black balls, which ratio-
nale does not rely on sensitivity to ambiguity of any sort. To rule out this
alternative rationale, we follow Ellsberg and the ensuing literature in consid-
ering also another choicein our case, that between B1 and Diff . A strict
preference for B1 can be understood as above as a reection of an aversion
to ambiguity about the relation between urns, (here the unfavorable scenario
for Diff is that the two urns might both be biased towards the same color),
which thus explainsboth rankings indicated in (2.1). In contrast, the pair
of rankings is inconsistent with beliefs that can be represented by any prob-
ability measure: there does not exist a measure P on the four possible pairs
of colors satisfying
P (R1) > P (Same) , P (B1) > P (Diff)
P (R1) + P (B1) = 1 = P (Same) + P (Diff) .
More formally, the rankings contradict probabilistic sophistication as dened
by Machina and Schmeidler (1992).3 Note that such a contradiction exists
also if (2.1) is weakened so that at most one of the rankings is weak. Such
behavior is abbreviated below as One  Two.
3Familiarity with their formal denition is not needed in the sequel. The reader can
take probabilistic sophistication to mean simply that there exists a probability measure
such that, when choosing between bets, the individual always prefers to bet on the event
having higher probability.
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A contradiction to probabilistic sophistication exists also if both rankings
in (2.1) are reversed, with at least one of them strict, which we abbreviate
by Two  One. In the Ellsberg experiment, where the composition of one
urn is known, a preference to bet on the unknown urn is naturally under-
stood as ambiguity seeking. Here, however, because both urns have unknown
compositions and all four bets considered above are ambiguous, the behavior
we study does not justify taking a stand on whether the individual likes or
dislikes ambiguity about correlation in an absolute rather than relative sense.
As a result, just as we interpreted (2.1) above in terms of relative ambigu-
ity aversion, we interpret the pair of reverse rankings as indicating a lesser
aversion to (or a greater a¢ nity for) ambiguity about the relation between
urns than to ambiguity about the bias of any single urn.
Besides those discussed thus far, all other choices in One vs Two are
consistent with probabilistic sophistication. For example, the rankings
Same  R1 and B1  Diff (2.2)
can be rationalized by any probability measure satisfying P (B1B2)  P (R1B2).
A Bayesian with an i.i.d. prior uniform within each urn would be indi¤erent
between all four bets indicated.
We turn now to describing our experimental investigation of One vs Two.
3 Experimental Design
We conducted three experiments (in 2013, 2014 and 2015) that study the
behavior in One vs Two. We report the two earlier studies in Appendix A.1.4
We concentrate here on the nal experiment which included two experimental
designs.
Subjects were presented with two (ambiguous) urns and were told that
each contained two balls, each ball being either red or black, and also a third
(risky) urn that contained one red and one black ball.5
4In 2014 we included important control treatments that tested alternative explanations
for failure of probabilistic sophistication in One vs Two.
5The language in the experiment used jars and marbles that were blue or green.
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3.1 Pairwise choices
In the main experimental design, which was also employed in the earlier
experiments, subjects were presented with versions of the following six choice
problems. Note that in the rst four choice problems, subjects were asked to
consider only the two ambiguous urns.
Red vs Di¤erent (1): Choose between a bet that pays if the color of the
ball drawn from a single urn is red and a bet that pays if the balls
drawn from the two urns have di¤erent colors.
Black vs Di¤erent (2): Choose between a bet that pays if the color of
the ball drawn from a single urn is black and a bet that pays if the
balls drawn from the two urns have di¤erent colors.
Black vs Same (3): Choose between a bet that pays if the color of the
ball drawn from a single urn is black and a bet that pays if the balls
drawn from the two urns have the same color.
Red vs Same (4): Choose between a bet that pays if the color of the ball
drawn from a single urn is red and a bet that pays if the balls drawn
from the two urns have the same color.
Standard Ellsberg Red (5): Choose between a bet that pays if the color
of the ball drawn from one of the two ambiguous urns is red and a bet
that the color of a ball drawn from a third urn containing one red ball
and one black ball (a risky urn as in Ellsberg) is red.
Standard Ellsberg Black (6): Choose between a bet that pays if the color
of the ball drawn from one of the two ambiguous urns is black and a
bet that the color of a ball drawn from a third urn containing one red
ball and one black ball (a risky urn as in Ellsberg) is black.
Note that the rst four choice problems included two variations of (2.1),
where each pair of problems (1/3 and 2/4) allowed the experimenter to detect
violation of probabilistic sophistication.
The choice problems above were organized in triplets, which allowed us
to infer strict and weak rankings from choices by slightly varying the prizes,
assuming monotone and transitive preferences. For example, problem 3
asked the subject to choose between a bet paying $25 if the ball drawn
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from urn 1 is black and a bet paying $25 if the balls drawn from the two
urns are of the same color. Choice made in this problem reveals only weak
preference. Problem 3 (3) was similar except that the winning prize on the
latter (former) bet was increased to $26. The choice to bet on the single
urn in problem 3 implies strict preference when the two prizes are equal; and
symmetrically if one chooses in problem 3to bet on the two colors being the
same. Choice of the two bets (in both 3 and 3) that pay $25 is inconsistent
with monotone and transitive preference. Choice of the two bets that pay
$26, together with either choice in 3reveals only weak preference between
the bets.6 The rationale behind this design was explained to subjects before
they answered any questions.
In the same way, the experimental design can reveal strict and weak
ambiguity attitudes through versions of the two standard Ellsberg choice
problems. Note that a subject who weakly prefers bets on the color of the
ball drawn from the risky urn to the corresponding bets on the color of the
ball drawn from an ambiguous urn does not necessarily violate probabilistic
sophistication. However, if at least one of the above preferences is strict, we
can infer that she must be strictly ambiguity averse and not probabilistically
sophisticated. This approach yields lower and upper bounds on the frequency
of ambiguity attitude.
Finally, a similar procedure is applied to versions of the rst four problems
above (concerning One vs Two). Here also the distinction between weak and
strict preference is important. For example, a subject who weakly prefers R1
to Diff and B1 to Same is only weakly more averse to ambiguity about
correlation than towards bias and may be probabilistically sophisticated.
However, if she strictly prefers either R1 or B1, then OneTwo and there is
necessarily a violation of probabilistic sophistication. In a symmetric manner
we dene a subject who is strictly (weakly) more averse to ambiguity about
bias than about correlation, and denote this preference by Two ()One.
It may be helpful to behaviorallyclassify subjects into those who always
choose the higher prize in every pair of problems in which the prizes are
di¤erent, and those who sometimes choose the bet with the lower prize.
The rst group never exhibits strict preference, and therefore is consistent
6It is important to remember that the choice of the two bets paying $26 in the problems
in which prizes di¤er is consistent with indi¤erence. However, it could be that lowering
the higher prize to $25+" (for example, $25:1) in these problems might cause a subject to
choose the same bet in all three comparisons, thus revealing strict preference when prizes
are equal.
9
with probabilistic sophistication. Subjects in the second group may exhibit
behavior that is inconsistent with probabilistic sophistication (Ellsbergian
ambiguity aversion or seeking, One  Two or Two  One), or make choices
that are consistent with non-symmetricprobabilistic beliefs (for example,
R1  R3 and B3  B1 in the Ellsberg case, and Diff  R1 and B1  Same
in One vs Two).
This design of choice problems, which we have not seen used previously,
allows us to identify a strict ordinal ranking without using a cardinal valua-
tion. Methods based on elicitation of cardinal valuations of bets (matching
tasks), such as Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) used in Halevy (2007) or a
discrete version using a choice list used in Abdellaoui et al (2011), can obvi-
ously identify strict ranking. The problem is that often the response modes
(matching vs. choice tasks) disagree. One may be worried, however, that
our new design increases the complexity of the choice problems subjects are
required to consider. To partially answer this concern, we included in the
experiment a choice list design such as has been used in many experimental
studies.
3.2 Choice lists
In addition to the main pairwise choice design, in 2015 we included a stan-
dard choice list design. The latter elicits an approximation to the certainty
equivalents of the six bets (each with winning and losing prizes $25 and $0
respectively): Red, Black, Same, Di¤erent, Risky (50%) Red, Risky (50%)
Black. In each choice list the subject was asked to make 20 pairwise choices
between the bet and a sure amount, which varied in increments of at least
$1 from $0 to $25. The rst comparison in which a subject chooses the sure
amount approximates the subjects certainty equivalent, and can serve as a
cardinal index for utility. Thus, the comparison made in One vs Two and in
the Ellsberg standard problem may be achieved by comparing the switching
points of the di¤erent bets. In order to mimic the strict preference elicitation
achieved in the pairwise choice design, we elicited strict preference between
two bets only if the di¤erence between their switching points is at least two
lines.7
7A common practice is to use a single line di¤erence as indicating strict preference.
However, it could be that a subject is indi¤erent between two bets and a sure amount that
appears on the choice list, and when forced to choose breaks the indi¤erence di¤erently
in the two lists. The use of two line di¤erences makes this scenario impossible (a similar
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3.3 Incentives and other details
Payment was determined by randomly selecting a single choice problem for
payment before subjects made their choices, by distributing (before the actual
experiment started) sealed envelopes containing a number of a randomly
selected choice problem (and a randomly selected line in the case of choice
lists) among the participants in the experiment. The envelopes were opened
only after subjects made all their choices and the balls were drawn from the
urns.
This version of the Random Incentive System (RIS) is theoretically in-
centive compatible in eliciting ambiguity attitudes (Baillon, Halevy and Li
2014), because the order suggests that choices are between lotteries over Sav-
age acts wherein ambiguity cannot be hedged. We do not nd evidence that
subjects used the RIS to hedge the di¤erent sources of ambiguity. See Ap-
pendix A.2.4 for further discussion and examples, and for detailed evidence.
Subjects were recruited from UBCs Vancouver School of Economics sub-
ject pool using ORSEE (Greiner 2015) to an experiment that promised par-
ticipants a chance to earn up to $36 during a one hour experiment in decision
making (including a show-up fee of $10). After consent forms were signed,
the instructions were read aloud.
In order to eliminate a potential suspicion that the experimenter could
manipulate the composition of the urns, each subject was asked at the be-
ginning of the experiment to choose the urn (1 or 2) on which to bet in all
those bets that involve a single urn. To simplify exposition of the results, we
proceed as though all individuals chose urn 1. Thus, for example, the bet on
red from the single urn is represented by R1. Throughout the experiment the
language used in the description of the di¤erent bets was completely symmet-
ric, enumerating the states in which each bet pays. Complete instructions
may be found in the Online Appendix.
4 Experimental Results
This section describes the main results of the experiments described above
(and conducted in 2015). The results of previous experiments (conducted in
2014 and 2013), which had higher stakes and included additional treatments
that support our interpretation of the behavior, are included in Appendix
approach was taken in Halevy (2015)).
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A.2. The latter also contains some additional information regarding the
2015 results.
Out of 153 subjects who took part in the pairwise choice experiment,
19 made choices inconsistent with monotone and transitive preferences in
at least one (out of six) triplet of choices. An additional 5 subjects made
intransitive choices between triplets of choices problems.8 The results re-
ported below are restricted to the remaining 129, although adding (to the
extent possible9) some of these subjects does not substantially change any of
the ndings. The average payment was $17.01 with a standard deviation of
$12.79.
The choice list treatment included 77 subjects, 3 of whom had multiple
switching lines or did not respond in some of the decision problems. The
reported results are restricted to the remaining 74 subjects. The average
payment was $19.62 (including a show-up payment of $5) with a standard
deviation of $9.20.
There was no overlap between the subjects who completed the pairwise
choice experiment and those who completed the choice list experiment.
Note that there are many ways in which randomchoices in the pairwise
choice design would lead to cyclical rankings (since subjects made choices in
two di¤erent variations of (2.1)). We nd no empirical evidence of such
behavior.10 Similarly, the low frequency of multiple switching in the choice
list design (only 3 subjects), and the symmetry in the valuations of di¤erent
colors (only 10 subjects had color valuations that vary in more than $1) lead
us to conclude that choices were deliberate.
8For example, a subject may exhibit R1  Diff , Diff  B1, B1  Same, and
Same  R1.
913 subjects made choices inconsistent with monotone or transitive preferences in two
or more triplets. For 8, we could not impute any ranking since there were too many
missing data; 3 were Ellsbergian ambiguity averse but there was no conclusive evidence
for strict preference between bets on One and Two.
Another 6 subjects made choices inconsistent with monotone or transitive preferences in
only a single triplet. Three of them were Ellsbergian ambiguity averse, and two of the
three made choices consistent with OneTwo (the other 3 made choices consistent with
probabilistic beliefs in both domains).
Five other subjects made choices inconsistent with transitive preferences across triplets.
None of them was Ellsbergian ambiguity averse, but 3 violated probabilistic choices in at
least one pair of triplets.
10The code checks for all such cycles and is available from the authors.
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Ellsbergian Ambiguity Attitude Pairwise Choice Choice List
# % # %
strictly averse (nonPS) 60 46.5 30 40.5
strictly seeking (nonPS) 3 2.3 10 13.5
weakly averse 37 28.7 5 6.8
weakly seeking 14 10.9 5 6.8
neutral   20 27.0
non-symmetric beliefs (PS) 15 11.6 4 5.4
Total 129 100 74 100
Table 4.1: Ellsbergian ambiguity attitude
4.1 Ellsbergian ambiguity
Table 4.1 presents the attitude towards Ellsbergian ambiguity as derived from
choices between bets on the color of a ball drawn from the ambiguous urn
and bets on the color of the ball drawn from the risky urn.
In the pairwise choice, 63 out of 129 subjects (48.8%) exhibit strict am-
biguity attitude and hence are not probabilistically sophisticated (nonPS);
all but 3 are ambiguity averse. The corresponding numbers in the choice list
elicitation are 40 out of 74 (54%), and 75% of them are strictly ambiguity
averse.
The choices made by the remaining subjects are consistent with proba-
bilistic sophistication (PS). It is important to remember that in the pairwise
choice elicitation method we cannot elicit indi¤erence, but only weak prefer-
ence. It is possible that some of the 51 subjects who revealed weak ambiguity
preference, (those who chose the risky bet when prizes are equal and oth-
erwise chose the bet with the higher prize), are indi¤erent between bets on
risky and ambiguous events, and that for others the premium we used ($1)
was too large to reveal strict preference. In particular, it is possible that
these 51 subjects all violate probabilistic sophistication.11 The categories la-
beled as weak preferencein the choice list correspond to a di¤erence of $1
in the switching lines (as noted in Section 3.2), while ambiguity neutrality
11The fact that 72.5% of the subjects who exhibited weak preference chose the risky
bets when the prizes were equal is consistent with the hypothesis that the proportion of
ambiguity averse subjects among them is higher than the proportion of ambiguity seeking
subjects.
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One vs Two Pairwise Choice Choice List
# % # %
One  Two (nonPS) 25 19.4 25 33.8
Two  One (nonPS) 10 7.7 18 24.3
One  Two 30 23.3 5 6.8
Two  One 15 11.6 1 1.3
One  Two 15 11.6 17 23.0
non-symmetric beliefs (PS) 34 26.4 8 10.8
Total 129 100 74 100
Table 4.2: One vs Two
corresponds to exactly the same switching line.
The nal category in Table 4.1 (non-symmetric beliefs) includes subjects
who, when comparing bets on one color preferred the ambiguous urn, and
when comparing bets on the other color preferred the risky urn.12 Seven sub-
jects made choices consistent with strictly non-symmetric beliefs and another
eight subjects made choices consistent with weakly non-symmetric beliefs.
The frequency of this behavior in the choice list design is much lower (only
4 out of 74 subjects).
Comparing the two elicitation methods, they detect ambiguity aversion
and neutrality at roughly similar rates, pairwise choice classies proportion-
ally more subjects as having non-symmetric beliefs over the composition of
the ambiguous urn, and the choice list design nds relatively more evidence
for ambiguity seeking.
4.2 One vs Two
Table 4.2 presents the attitude in One vs Two as derived from choices between
bets on the color of a ball drawn from a single ambiguous urn and bets on
the colors of the balls drawn from the two ambiguous urns.
In the pairwise choice design, 35 subjects (out of 129) made choices in
One vs Two that are inconsistent with probabilistic sophistication, 71% of
them strictly preferring a bet on the bias to a bet on the relation between
12Note that these choices must be consistent with choices made in the rst four decision
problems that study rankings in One vs Two.
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the urns. Another 45 subjects made choices that reveal weak preference to
bet on bias or on correlation (two thirds of them weakly preferred bets on
bias). As discussed above, some of them may hold probabilistic beliefs, but
for others the $1 di¤erence in prizes may have been too high to reveal strict
preference. Altogether, between 35 and 80 subjects (out of 129) made choices
consistent with violation of probabilistic sophistication in One vs Two.
In the choice list elicitation, probabilistic sophistication was contradicted
by 43 subjects (out of 74), of whom 58% strictly preferred betting on bias
rather than on correlation between the urns. An additional 6 subjects showed
weak preference ($1 di¤erence in the switching points), and may have shown
strict preference if the di¤erence between lines in the choice list were smaller.
The category OneTwo in Table 4.2 includes subjects who did not ex-
hibit any strict preferences between the 4 ambiguous bets and who were not
included in the two previous lines. This includes 15 subjects in the pairwise
choice and 17 subjects in the choice list.
The last category in Table 4.2 includes subjects who made choices con-
sistent with probabilistic beliefs that assign a strictly higher likelihood that
the urns are positively rather than negatively correlated (or vice versa); for
example, Same  R1 and B1  Diff (where at least one ranking is strict).
This pattern of choices is quite common in the pairwise choice design as 34
subjects (26.4% of 129) are classied in this way. It is not as frequent in the
choice list treatment (only 8 subjects, 10.8% of 74).
Comparing the two elicitation methods, some di¤erences emerge. First,
the proportion of subjects that are not probabilistically sophisticated is much
higher in the list elicitation than in the pairwise choice (58.1% vs. 27.1%).
However, the di¤erence is much smaller when considering also subjects that
exhibited weak preference in One vs Two. Even among the probabilisti-
cally sophisticated subjects there are di¤erences between the two elicitation
methods. The pairwise choice treatment yields relatively more subjects ex-
hibiting non-symmetric attitude between Same andDiff (26.4% vs. 10.8%),
and the choice list treatment identies more subjects as being indi¤erent be-
tween all ambiguous bets (23% vs 11.6%). We nd these di¤erences, like
the di¤erences in the elicitation of Ellsbergian ambiguity attitude, intriguing
and deserving independent experimental investigation. We conjecture that
some of the di¤erences can be attributed to the fact the choice list compares
(approximation to) certainty equivalents (which integrates payments and be-
liefs), while in pairwise choice no such integration is necessary. It could also
be that the relatively large tickof $1 contributed to these di¤erences. Fi-
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nally, it is possible that the pairwise choice method we have proposed here
is cognitively more taxing relative to the choice list method, leading to more
noise in measurement of underlying preferences.13
4.3 Comparison
In the pairwise choice design, the proportion of subjects whose choices are
consistent with probabilistic sophistication is higher in One vs Two (72.9%)
than in the standard Ellsberg problem (51.2%). This di¤erence may not be
surprising, in hindsight, because, as we suggest next, there is more scope for
probabilistically sophisticated behavior in One vs Two than in Ellsberg, even
for a subject who dislikes (or alternatively likes) ambiguity. In the choice
list design, however, we did not observe such a di¤erence in the relative
frequency of probabilistic sophistication: choices consistent with probabilistic
sophistication were made by 34 subjects in the Ellsberg problems and by 31
subjects in One vs Two.
In the classic Ellsberg problem, the choice of the risky urn leaves the sub-
ject with a purely risky bet in which the probability of winning is 50%. Thus,
the preference to bet on the risky urn, and hence violation of probabilistic
sophistication, arises given only aversion to uncertainty about the bias of the
ambiguous urn. In contrast, in the choice problem One vs Two all alterna-
tives (the bets R1, B1, Same and Diff) are ambiguous. Accordingly, as
explained when discussing our thought experiment, choices depend on which
is more importantambiguity about bias or ambiguity about how urns di¤er
or are related. If these opposing motives exactly o¤set one another, then lack
of strict preference between R1; B1; Same and Diff (classied under One 
Two, Two  One, or OneTwo in Table 4.2) could result. This rationale
includes 20 subjects in the pairwise choice design and 8 in the choice list
design whose choices are not probabilistically sophisticated in the Ellsberg
problems (total of 63 and 40 in the pairwise choice and choice list designs) but
do not exhibit strict preference in One vs Two. Hence, this behavior is con-
sistent with all bets being perceived equally ambiguous. Our categorization
of this behavior as being probabilistically sophisticated in Table 4.2 reects
the conservative (and demanding) approach we are adopting throughout to
identifying empirical support for the e¤ects of ambiguity about correlation.
13Noise should be distinguished from random choices, as the latter will lead to cyclical
choice patterns - that we do not observe here.
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There is another possibility consistent with probabilistic sophistication in
One vs Two, namely the rankings Diff  R1 and B1  Same, which is a
variant of (2.2). Such rankings can arise from a strong belief about how the
urns were constructed. As an extreme example, suppose that the subjects
hypothesis is that the experimenter drew two balls without replacement from
an auxiliary urn containing one red ball and one black ball, and if a red
(black) ball was drawn rst, then urn 1 was lled with 2 red (black) balls;
urn 2 was then lled with two balls of the opposite color. Then it is certain
that the balls drawn from urns 1 and 2 have di¤erent colors and thus Diff
pays x (25 or 26) and Same pays 0, each with certainty, so that R1 is ranked
between them. The latter might arise also more generally from the feeling
that there are only so many red balls to go around,say because the urns
are thought to have been constructed by drawing without replacement from
an auxiliary urn containing n  2 balls of each color. The description of
urns given to the subjects does not suggest this perception but there is no
reason to rule it out. Probabilistic sophistication is consistent also with the
rankings (2.2) as indicated at the end of Section 2. This might arise if urns
are perceived to have a common component, so that a red draw from urn
1 indicates that a red draw is more likely also from urn 2; for example, if
the preceding construction is modied so that draws from the auxiliary urn
are made with replacement. Out of the subjects who are not probabilistic
sophisticated in the Ellsberg problem (63 and 40 in the pairwise choice and
choice list elicitations, respectively) there are many subjects who exhibit
this pattern (23 and 4 in the two methods, respectively). The substantial
di¤erence in the patterns across the methods suggests that at least part of
the interpretations above depend on the specic incentive system used to
elicit rankings.
In a similar vein, not all subjects who violate probabilistic sophistication
in One vs Two, violate it also in the Ellsberg problem. Out of 35 and 43
in the pairwise choice and choice list methods, respectively, only 20 and 25
violate probabilistic sophistication in the Ellsberg problem. For example,
some subjects are ambiguity neutral or even ambiguity seeking when betting
on bias, but are averse to the ambiguity concerning the correlation between
the urns.
For the reasons given above, we do not expect behavior in One vs Two to
mirror behavior in the Ellsberg problems. Indeed, although the association
between probabilistic sophistication in the two problems is signicant in the
choice list elicitation (Fisher exact test p-value 3.4%), the association is not
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signicant when measured in the pairwise choice design (Fisher exact test p-
value > 10%).14 When partitioning the set of probabilistically sophisticated
subjects in One vs Two into those who expressed or did not express strict
preference, we nd a signicant association between the two domains (Fisher
exact test p-value 0.3%): subjects who did not express strict preference in
one domain (Ellsberg / One vs Two) tended not to express strict preference
in the other domain as well.15
5 Models
Consider how the behavior exhibited in the experiment can be modeled. As
shown earlier, both OneTwo and TwoOne contradict probabilistic sophis-
tication, and hence, in particular, subjective expected utility theory. Thus
we are led to consider generalizations of the latter that were developed in re-
sponse to Ellsbergs experiments; the maxmin expected utility model (Gilboa
and Schmeidler 1989) is one prominent example, and others include Choquet
expected utility (Schmeidler 1989), the smooth model (Nau 2006; Klibano¤,
Marinacci and Mukerji 2005; Seo 2009), and variational utility (Maccheroni,
Marinacci and Rustichini 2006). All of these models have many free pa-
rameters and thus can accommodate a broad range of ambiguity-sensitive
behaviors. For an extremely simple example, both Ellsbergian ambiguity
aversion and OneTwo are implied by a Choquet expected utility preference
if we specify the representing capacity (or non-additive probability measure)
 so that
 (R1) =  (B1) = :3 and  (Same) =  (Diff) = :2; (5.1)
and TwoOne is accommodated instead if :2 is replaced by :4. Similarly the
new behavior identied here does not pose a challenge for the other models.
However, our objective is not merely to model the behavior observed in
the idealized laboratory setting with Ellsberg urns. We wish also to deter-
mine what the experimental results suggest about modeling behavior outside
the laboratory when uncertainty is due to multiple random events (as we
have seen, portfolio choice is one example; statistical decision problems are
typically of this form; see Section 6 for more). These applications suggest a
14This is due to the fact that many subjects who are Ellsbergian ambiguity averse make
choices in One vs Two that may be rationalized by the rankings (2.2).
15See further discussion in Appendix A.2.3.
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Cartesian product state space and the desirability of preference models that
are designed to address and exploit this special structure. Rationalization
through (5.1), or similar exercises, do not satisfy the latter requirement. The
Bayesian benchmark is the special case of subjective expected utility, due to
de Finetti (1937), where the Savage predictive prior on the state space has
the well-known conditionally i.i.d.form.16
With the preceding motivation, we consider two classes of models in this
section. The rst builds on de Finetti by adding a role for ambiguity. For
the second, we adapt an approach to modeling Ellsberg-style behavior that
centers on multiple sources(Tversky and Fox 1995; Tversky and Wakker
1995). This model captures naturally and simply a main point of the paper,
namely the distinction between three kinds (or sources) of uncertainty: risk,
bias and correlation.
5.1 Conditionally i.i.d. models
The four possible outcomes of the two draws lie in the state space S1  S2,
where, for i = 1; 2, Si = fRi; Big. For any subset A of outcomes, A denotes
also the corresponding bet with prizes x and 0. According to the maxmin
model, the utility of the bet on A is given by
U (A) = min
P2P
P (A) , (5.2)
where P is a set of probability measures on S1  S2, the set of predictive
priors.17 (The model includes also a vNM utility index u, which here we
have normalized to satisfy u (x) = 1 and u (0) = 0.)
More generally, consider all utility functions over bets of the form
U (A) =W
 
(P (A))P2P

, (5.3)
where P is a set of predictive priors and where W is weakly increasing in the
sense that
U (A0)  U (A) if P (A0)  P (A) for all P 2 P.
16See Kreps (1988, Ch. 11) for a description and for a discussion of its importance as
a normative guide to decision-making.
17We follow common terminology in that predictive priorrefers to beliefs about the
payo¤ relevant state space and prior refers to beliefs about unknown probability laws
or parameters.
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We consider alternative specications for P and W .
In the benchmark Bayesian model, each urn is parametrized by a common
unknown parameter p, 0  p  1, representing the proportion of red balls in
the urn. In addition, the two draws are taken to be i.i.d. conditional on the
true but unknown p, and uncertainty about p is modeled by a (single) prior
over its possible values. Because beliefs are probabilistic, this model cannot
accommodate the preference for One over Two (or the reverse) as noted,
one needs to permit a role for ambiguity. The simplest way to do so is to
generalize the preceding by positing a nonsingleton set M of priors about
the value of p. Each prior  inM induces a predictive prior P in the familiar
way described by
P =
Z
(p
 p)d (p) , (5.4)
where p
 p denotes the i.i.d. product of the measure on fR;Bg that assigns
the probability p to the outcome R. By varying over all priors in M, one
obtains the set Pexch of predictive priors. Using this set of predictive priors in
(5.3), without any further restrictions on W , constitutes a seemingly natural
generalization of de Finettis model. (Models of this form are studied in
Epstein and Seo (2010, Model 1), Al Najjar and De Castro (2014), Cerreia-
Vioglio et al (2013) and Klibano¤, Mukerji and Seo (2014)).
However, this generalized conditionally i.i.d. model cannot simultaneously
accommodate both OneTwo and Ellsbergian (strict) ambiguity aversion:
from the fact that p2 + (1  p)2  1
2
for all p in [0; 1], infer that for every P
of the form (5.4),
P (Same) =
Z 
p2 + (1  p)2 d (p)  1
2
.
It follows, given only that W is monotonic, that Same is weakly preferred to
betting on red in a 50-50 urn. Adding Ellsbergian ambiguity aversion yields
Same  R1, contrary to OneTwo.
The intuitive reason for this limitation is clear: though there is ambiguity
about p, the fact that every predictive prior in Pexch has the form in (5.4)
expresses certainty that draws are conditionally i.i.d., which is contrary to the
rationale for preferring to bet on the single urn. This intuition suggests, and it
is readily conrmed,18 that the conditionally i.i.d. model can accommodate
18Let 0 < q < 1=2 be xed and let P consist of the two i.i.d. predictive priors
q 
 q and (1  q)
 (1  q). Let W be as in maxmin. Then U (R1) = U (B1) = q,
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both TwoOne and Ellsbergian ambiguity aversion.19 The reason is that
TwoOne indicates the predominance of ambiguity about the composition
of each urn and this can be captured adequately by multiple priors about p.
5.2 A source-based model
We consider next a model that relaxes the restriction that the set P contains
only conditionally i.i.d. measures, while retaining structure that reects the
distinction between risk, uncertain bias and uncertain correlation.
A streamlined version of the model is described diagrammatically in Fig-
ure 5.1. (A more general and precise specication is provided in Appendix
A.3.) Notationally, the composition of a single urn is described by a prob-
ability vector of the form (p; 1  p), where p denotes the proportion of red,
and the joint composition of the two urns is described by a probability vector
of the form (pRB; pBR; pRR; pBB). If urns 1 and 2 are described by (p; 1  p)
and (q; 1  q) respectively, then (p; 1  p) 
 (q; 1  q) denotes the joint dis-
tribution given by the product measure,
(p; 1  p)
 (q; 1  q)  (p(1  q); q (1  p) ; pq; (1  p) (1  q)) .
Figure 5.1: Hierarchical beliefs on the two ambiguous urns
The evaluation of a bet may be inuenced by the following three issues:
U (Same) = q2 + (1  q)2 > 1=2 and U (Diff) = 2q (1  q) > q, which implies all
the desired rankings.
19Of the 60 (30) subjects in the pairwise choice (choice list) design who were strictly
ambiguity averse in the Ellsberg sense, 12 (9) exhibited OneTwo and 8 (13) exhibited
TwoOne.
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Issue 1 Uncertainty about the relation between urns takes the form of two alter-
native hypotheses. One possibility entertained by the decision-maker
is that the urns are i.i.d. according to (p; 1  p) for some (unspecied)
p 2 0; 1
2
; 1
	
, that is, the two urns can be described by a measure in the
set P ident in the gure. The alternative hypothesis is that the urns are
complementary in the sense that their joint distribution lies in the
set Pcompl in the gure. This hypothesis is justied, for example, by the
following perception of how the urns are constructed: there is a set of
two red and two black ballstwo are drawn without replacement to ll
urn 1 and the remaining two are put into urn 2. The two hypotheses
are assigned subjective probabilities  and 1   respectively.
Issue 2 Conditioning on either of the above hypotheses, the composition, or
bias, of each urn is uncertain. The decision-maker assigns (conditional)
probability 1
3
to each possible value of p.
Issue 3 After conditioning on both the relation between urns and on the bias,
there remains uncertainty about the colors of the two drawn balls.
However, resolution of Issues 1 and 2 implies a unique probability dis-
tribution over fR1B2; B1R2; R1R2; B1B2g. Thus the last issue concerns
risk.
Each bet (or act) f associates a (dollar) payo¤ to each terminal node,
depending on the colors of the two balls drawn. Thus it induces a 3-stage
lottery, denoted Df , which is evaluated recursively along the lines of Kreps
and Porteus (1978): as Appendix A.3 details, an expected utility function is
used at each stage, with di¤erent utility indices for di¤erent issues, and com-
pound lotteries are evaluated recursively.20 The utility of a bet on Ellsbergs
risky urn is computed by identifying the (single-stage) lottery induced by the
bet with a three-stage lottery that is resolved completely at the third stage.
Denote the utility indices by u3 (used to evaluate risk or one-stage lotteries),
u2 (used to address uncertainty due to the unknown bias), and u1 (used to
address the rst issue). For simplicity, take u3 to be linear.
The model is a special case of (5.3), where the set P is equal to the
union of the sets P ident and Pcompl dened in the gure; hence, P contains
measures (all those in Pcompl ) that do not conform to (5.4). The recursive
structure of utility denes the corresponding function W .
20For more on such recursive models see, for example, Segal (1987, 1990), and Ergin
and Gul (2009). Segal advocates using non-expected utility functions at each stage.
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Turn to behavior. Because the bets of interest depend on di¤erent issues,
the models predictions depend largely on the curvatures (both absolute and
relative) of u1 and u2. In particular, Ellsbergian ambiguity aversion (a¢ nity)
is implied if and only if u2 is concave (convex). In comparing One vs Two,
the bets R1 and B1 are subject to uncertainty about the bias, but their
payo¤s do not depend on the rst issue because they concern only a single
urn. In contrast, the payo¤s to both Same andDiff depend crucially on the
relation between urns. This suggests that the choices in One vs Two depend
on both the relative curvatures of u1 and u2 and on the magnitude of . If we
take  = 1
2
, then One()Two is implied if u1 is more (less) concave than
u2. Consequently, the model can handle all preference patterns observed
in our experiments by allowing su¢ cient heterogeneity in the curvatures of
subjectsutility indices and in beliefs over the relation between the urns (see
Appendix A.3).
6 Concluding Discussion
The literature stimulated by Ellsberg, particularly the experimental litera-
ture, has focused on the two-fold distinction between risk and ambiguity,
or Knightian uncertainty. In Ellsbergs two-urn experiment, the latter is
embodied in the uncertain bias (or composition) of the unknown urn. In a
setting with multiple ambiguous urns, we have introduced a second source of
ambiguitythe relation between urns. Thus we have studied the three-fold
distinction between risk, bias and the relation between biases. The results
of our laboratory experiments provide support for the empirical relevance of
the new dimension, and its relation to Knightian uncertainty.
To conclude, we describe concrete instances of decision-making where
ambiguity about correlation is potentially relevant, and then we consider
some related literature.
6.1 More on economic signicance
As noted in the introduction, betting on the draws from a sequence of urns is
intended as a canonical example of choice problems where payo¤s to an action
depend on multiple random events (or variables). Portfolio choice is one such
problem as discussed in the introduction. Here we describe other instances
where ambiguity about correlation is plausibly a concern for a decision-maker.
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Suppose, for example, that the outcome si of the i-th random event is
given by an equation of the form
si =   xi + i, i = 1; 2; :::; I. (6.1)
There may be di¤erences between the underlying mechanismsthese are cap-
tured by the vectors xi which describe the observable heterogeneity (in the
urns context, there is no observable heterogeneity). The decision-maker
chooses between bets on the outcomes of the I random variables. Her choices
depend on her model of the residuals or unobserved heterogeneity i, which
are the source of the uncertainty she faces. If all sources of heterogeneity
of which she is aware are included in the xis, then it is natural that she be
indi¤erent between any two bets on the realization of residuals that di¤er
only in a reordering of the random variables. However, the individual may
not be condent that the xis describe all relevant di¤erences, in which case
she may not be certain that residuals are identical, or that they are related in
any particular way. Though she may not be able to describe further forms of
heterogeneity, she may be worried that there are gaps in her understanding
that could be important and thus she may wish to take into account their
possible existence when making choices.
A number of studies have argued for the importance of such a lack of
condence. In all the examples below, the decision-maker should be thought
of as a policy maker, where policies can be identied with (Savage-style) acts
that pay o¤ according to the outcomes of the I random variables. In the
context of the cross-country growth literature where each random variable
corresponds to the growth rate for one of I countries, Brock and Durlauf
(2001) point to the open-endedness of growth theories as a reason for skep-
ticism that all possible di¤erences between countries can be accounted for
(p. 231), and they emphasize the importance of heterogeneity uncertainty.
King (2001) makes a similar critique in an international relations context
where each random variable corresponds to a pair of countries and its out-
come is conict or lack of conict; he refers to unmeasured heterogeneity.21
This paper complements these critiques by translating them into behavioral
terms and thus giving more precise meaning to a concern with heterogeneity
uncertaintyor unmeasured heterogeneity.
21He writes (p. 498) that in international conict data are neither powerful nor even
adequate summaries of our qualitative knowledge, so that the common assumption of
exchangeability is usually violated.
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The applied IO literature provides an example of a di¤erent sort.22 Here
there is a cross-section of markets in each of which an entry game is played.
Thus each random variable corresponds to one of I markets and its outcome
is the number and identity of entrants in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The di¢ culty faced by the policy maker is that there may be multiple equi-
libria and she has little understanding of how equilibria are selected, and
accordingly how selection mechanisms may di¤er or be related across mar-
kets. A fourth example arises in repeated English auctions when, as in Haile
and Tamer (2003), because of the free-form nature of most English auctions
in practice, one makes weak assumptions about bidders behavior. Then
equilibrium behavior in each auction is multiple-valued and can be narrowed
down and related across auctions only via heroic assumptions. This has im-
plications for an auctioneer who is choosing reserve prices (Aryal and Kim
2013). Though our laboratory experiment does not investigate behavior in
the above specic settings, the results lend support to the hypothesis that
decision-makers may care about poorly understood di¤erences across markets
or auctions.
6.2 Related literature
We have already contrasted Ellsbergs classic two-urn experiment with ours.
Eliaz and Ortoleva (2016) and Eichberger et al (2015) modify Ellsbergs ex-
periment in order to study di¤erent dimensions of ambiguity; in addition
to ambiguity about the probability of winning, both papers consider also
ambiguity about the prize to be won, and the former considers in addition
ambiguity about the time delay for receipt of the prize. Their experiments
have in common with ours the investigation of multiple dimensions of ambi-
guity and the association between (ambiguity averse) behaviors in di¤erent
dimensions, but the dimensions studied are di¤erent; this leads also to
completely di¤erent experimental designs.
Multiple urns are used in experiments exploring learning and dynamic
consistency. These issues are not involved in our study because we consider
only ex ante choice.
Epstein and Seo (2010, Model 2) and (2015) present axiomatic mod-
els that generalize de Finettis Bayesian model in a way di¤erent from the
22We are referring to the literature on entry games and partial identication (see Tamer
2010, and the references therein). For an explicit choice-theoretic perspective, see Epstein
and Seo (2015).
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generalizations described in Section 5. Their capacity to accommodate the
behavior studied here is intermediate between the capacities of the two mod-
els examined above; more detail would take us too far aeld. We add only
that though they are axiomatic, their axioms are not nearly as simple and
transparent as the choice between betting on one urn or on two. Another
important di¤erence is that the axioms are formulated in terms of horse-
race/roulette wheel (Anscombe-Aumann) acts which are less natural objects
of choice than are the Savage-style acts considered here.23 Correspondingly,
while the former acts are prominent in axiomatic work and are used in some
laboratory experiments, we are not aware of any applied studies where they
have been used to model behavior in the eld or to explain eld dataobjects
of choice are universally formalized as lotteries or as Savage acts. This dis-
connect in the literature between Anscombe-Aumann acts and descriptive
modeling in the eld suggests (to us) that tests of preference models that
refer only to Savage-style acts are more relevant to the potential usefulness
of these models outside the laboratory.24
Finally, the role played in decision-making by the individuals perception
of correlation is the focus also in a literature on correlation neglect,includ-
ing, for example, experimental studies (Eyster and Weizsacker 2010, Enke
and Zimmerman forthcoming), applications (De Marzo et al 2003, Levy and
Razin 2015), and decision-theoretic foundations (Ellis and Piccione, 2017).
These papers concern environments where there is a trueprobability law
describing the uncertainty (that is, the law observed by the modeler), and
where the decision-maker is Bayesian but where she has wrong beliefs. Be-
cause of limited attention or other cognitive constraints, she misperceives the
connections between key random variables (for example, between returns to
di¤erent securities in nancial decision-making). A common hypothesis is
that she wrongly treats key correlated variables as independent. There is
no sense in these models that awareness of the complexity of her environ-
ment and self-awareness of her cognitive limitations lead the decision-maker
to doubt that her wrong beliefs are correct. Such doubts are what we are try-
23Savage-style acts can be thought of as consisting of the horse-race alone followed by
monetary prizes as opposed to the spin of a roulette-wheel; see Kreps (1988), particularly
Chs. 4 and 7.
24In discussing if/how the use of axioms involving Anscombe-Aumann acts makes sense,
Kreps (p. 101) writes In descriptive applications, axioms are supposed to concern behav-
ior that is observable, so what sense does it make to pose axioms about preferences/choices
that are never observed ...?
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ing to detect here, through behavior (such as OneTwo or TwoOne) that
contradicts probabilistic sophistication.25 Note that the Eyster-Weizsacker
and Enke-Zimmerman experiments are not designed to test for violations of
probabilistic sophistication.
In a very recent paper, Levy and Razin (2017) model agents who are self-
aware in the above sense and accordingly are averse to ambiguity about the
correlation between di¤erent sources of information. Correlation aversion is
modeled with a specic single-parameter (correlation capacity) functional
form which the authors apply to models of nancial investments and CDO
ratings. Thus preferences are assumed known to the modeler and some e¤ects
of changes in preferences are explored in specic settings. We see such work
as complementary to ours, which takes behavior alone to be observable and
asks which behavior would reveal a concern with ambiguous correlation?
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A Appendix
A.1 Design of earlier experiments (2013 and 2014)
We conducted two earlier experiments (in 2013 and 2014) to study the hy-
pothesized behavior of One vs Two. The two experiments had a similar main
treatment to the experiment reported in the body of the paper, although in
the 2014 experiment we changed the way we handled symmetry (which be-
came a redundant assumption due to the design of the 2015 experiment) and
we improved the explanation of the incentive system. More importantly, in
the 2014 experiment we added control treatments. In describing the design
we will focus on the 2014 experiment as it relates to the 2015 experiment
reported in the body of the paper, and note any di¤erences from the 2013
experiment.
A.1.1 Subjects, stakes and number of balls
Subjects were recruited from UBCs Vancouver School of Economics subject
pool using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). We made sure that no subject partici-
pated in more than a single treatment during all iterations of the experiment
(2013-2015). In addition to a $10 participation fee, they could earn up to
$51 ($101 in the 2013 experiment) during the one hour experiment. That is,
the absolute value of the stakes in the earlier experiments was twice (2014)
and four times (2013) higher than in the 2015 experiment. However, the
marginal incentive was constant (at $1) through all the experiments. This
implied that the proportional premium required to exhibit strict preference
is higher in the later experiments than in the earlier one. In other words, the
strict ambiguity sensitivity revealed in the later experiments is stronger
(in relative terms) than in our earlier experiments.
A minor di¤erence between the 2013 experiment and later experiments
is that in the rst experiment each urn contained 10 balls, while in later
experiments we used only 2 balls.
A.1.2 Choice problems
Choice problems were organized in pairs which allowed us to infer strict
ranking from choices by slightly varying the prizes. Compared to the pair-
wise choice design used in 2015, there were no pairs with equal payments
(which allows us to infer weak preference). Instead, lack of revealed strict
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preference (choosing the bets with the higher payment) is interpreted as in-
di¤erence. The design establishes an upper (lower) bound on the indi¤erence
(strict preference) class. Complete instructions may be found in the Online
Appendix.
In the 2014 experiment, subjects were presented with the following choice
problems.26
One vs Di¤erent: Choose between a bet on the color of the ball drawn
from a single urn and a bet that pays if the balls drawn from the two
urns have di¤erent colors.
One vs Same: Choose between a bet on the color of the ball drawn from
a single urn and a bet that pays if the balls drawn from the two urns
have the same color.
Same vs Di¤erent: Choose between a bet that pays if the balls drawn
from the two urns have the same color and a bet that pays if they have
di¤erent colors.
Color symmetry: Choose between bets on the two possible colors of the
ball drawn from a single urn.
Standard Ellsberg: Choose between a bet on the color of the ball drawn
from one of the two ambiguous urns and a bet on the color of a ball
drawn from a third urn containing one red ball and one blue ball (a
risky urn as in Ellsberg).
A.1.3 Control treatments (2014)
The 2014 experiment included two control treatments that were designed to
investigate our hypothesis that the preference for One over Two indicates
subjectsambiguity concerning the relation between the two urns. An alter-
native hypothesis is that a bet on the ball drawn from a single urn is preferred
because it is viewed as simple,while a bet that depends on two balls drawn
from the two urns is more complex.In order to test this hypothesis, two
urns  each with one red and one black ball, were presented to subjects.
26The 2013 experiment included two additional choice problems which are described in
the Online Appendix, but did not include the color symmetry choice problems which were
included in the 2014 experiment.
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There is no ambiguity in this environment, and the probabilities of winning
when betting on One, Same and Di¤erent are all equal to 0.5. However, the
calculation of probabilities in the latter two bets is more involved and requires
that the subject multiply probabilities correctly (reduction of compound ob-
jective lotteries - ROCL). There exists strong experimental evidence (Halevy
2007; Abdellaoui, Klibano¤ and Placido 2015; Chew, Miao and Zhong 2017;
Dean and Ortoleva 2016; Gillen, Snowberg and Yariv 2016) that violation of
reduction is frequent in the general population, so choosing One over Two
might be a manifestation of violation of ROCL. If the frequency of indi¤er-
ence in One vs Two is signicantly higher in the risk control than in the
two-urns ambiguity treatment, we conclude that the behavior of One over
Two reects something beyond the violation of reduction.
We implemented also a second control for two reasons, the rst being
that indi¤erence in the risk control above is extremely fragile. Secondly, we
wanted to examine whether our interpretation of the preferenceOne overTwo
can be supported also when the environment is ambiguous. As noted above,
there exists empirical evidence that relates ambiguity aversion and violations
of ROCL, and such violations in turn may be responsible for a preference to
bet on one urn. In this control, two draws were made with replacement from
a single ambiguous urn containing two balls (with unknown composition).
If a subject exhibits R1  Same in this environment, it cannot be because
of ambiguity about how the urns are related since the two draws are made
from the same (ambiguous) urn and hence from the identical composition.27
However, our interpretation of One over Two would be supported if the
frequency with which subjects exhibit the ranking R1  Same is signicantly
higher in the two-urns treatment than in this single-urn control.
A.1.4 Symmetry in colors
The 2013-2014 experimental designs relied on color symmetry (Ri  Bi for
i = 1; 2) to identify the behavior in One vs Two, since we asked subjects to
pick a single color to bet on. As a result, a Bayesian subject who holds non-
symmetric beliefs may strictly prefer One over Same and Diff . Though we
believe that symmetry in colors is a very natural assumption in the current
setting, we took two alternative approaches to handling the issue empirically.
In the 2013 experiment, before subjects made any payo¤-relevant choices,
27Note that in this environment, R1  Diff is easily rationalized, for example, by a
Bayesian model. Thus we focus on the the choice between R1 and Same.
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they were presented with four pairs of bets. The symmetry between urns
and between colors in the experiment implied indi¤erence within each pair.
Following the presentation of the four pairs, each subject was asked, in a
non-incentivized question, whether she agreed with the indi¤erences. Since
symmetry serves as an identifying restriction to evaluate various models in
light of the data, we thought it important to clarify this assumption to sub-
jects. Their response (agree/disagree) indicates their understanding of the
symmetry encoded in the experiment. We hypothesized, based on other stud-
ies, that most of the subjects will hold symmetric beliefs anyway. However,
we cannot exclude the possibility that this form of communication manipu-
lated some subjects with non-symmetric beliefs into symmetry.28 Regardless,
we believe that this is a desirable outcome since otherwise one would inter-
pret behavior in light of an identifying assumption (symmetry in colors) that
may not hold. In the 2014 experiment we adopted the more conservative
approach of asking subjects to make pairwise choices between bets on the
two colors, thus identifying possible non-symmetry directly and eliminating
any potential contamination of the other choice problems.
A.1.5 Incentive structure and hedging
As in the 2015, payment was determined by randomly choosing one choice
problem before subjects made their choices. Also, each subject was asked to
choose at the beginning of the experiment an urn (1 or 2) to bet on.
An important distinction from the 2015 experiment is that subjects did
not bet on both colors: the subject chose a color (red or black) to bet on in
the bets that involve a single urn. As a result, there is no risk that choices
consistent with OneTwo actually reect hedging rather than preference for
a bet on bias to a bet on relation. The empirical question whether subjects
hedged in spite of our implementation is discussed further below in Section
A.2.4.
A.2 More Results (2013-2015)
A total of 80 subjects participated in 4 sessions of the 2013 experiment.
Subjects were paid a total of CA$4,851 (an average of just over $60 per sub-
28One may argue that the instructionof symmetry may have a¤ected choices made
elsewhere. However, we believe that such a scenario is highly improbable and we could
not nd evidence to that e¤ect in the 2014 experiment.
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ject). Out of the 80 subjects, a total of 24 were removed from the analysis
reported immediately below. In particular, 18 subjects were removed due to
choices violating either monotonicity or transitivity, and 4 were removed for
disagreeing with symmetry over colors and urns (see below).29 This leaves
56 subjects. We consider this retention rate to be high when taking into
account the strong consistency (transitivity and monotonicity) that we im-
posed. We attribute this rate to the high stakes (more than $100) employed
in the experiment, which provided subjects su¢ cient incentive to minimize
arbitrariness and to consider their choices seriously.
87 subjects participated in the main treatment of the 2014 experiment,
of which 75 had no monotonicity or transitivity violations. The risk con-
trol included 47 subjects, of which 43 had no monotonicity violations. The
single-urn control included 42 subjects, of which 37 had no monotonicity or
transitivity violations. Subjects were paid a total of CA$6,734 (an average
of about $38.26 per subject).
All the results reported are robust to employing a less strict retention
criteria as reported in Appendix A.2.5.
A.2.1 Control treatments (2014)
In the risk control, 23 out of 43 subjects (53.5%) did not exhibit strict pref-
erence in choosing between One vs Same and One vs Diff . In the two-urn
treatment we nd that 28 out of 78 subjects (35.9%) exhibited this choice pat-
tern in this two choice problems. The di¤erence is signicant at 5% (p-value
of one-sided Z test is 0.0330). The nding that almost one half of subjects
in the risk control did not reduce objective compound lotteries is consistent
with the experimental evidence noted above. The fact that the frequency
of indi¤erence is signicantly lower in the two-urn treatment indicates that
choices in One vs Two are a¤ected by more than the simplicityof a bet
that depends on a single draw.
29We removed 11 for choosing in at least one pair of questions two lotteries with prizes
of $100, and 7 due, for example, to choices revealing that Same  R1  Diff based
on pairwise choice between R1 and the other two bets but choosing consistently with
Same  Diff in the direct pairwise choice. Two more subjects in the rst session were
caught cheating and their choices were excluded from the analysis (one of them had non-
transitive choices, and would have been removed in any case).
30A one-sided Fisher exact test, which is very conservative in comparing two binomial
samples, yields a p-value of 0.046.
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Ellsbergian Ambiguity Attitude 2013 2014
# % # %
strictly averse (nonPS) 37 66.1 29 52.7
strictly seeking (nonPS) 4 7.1 0 0
neutral (PS) 15 26.8 26 47.3
Total 56 100 55 100
Table A.1: Ellsbergian ambiguity attitude 2013-2014
In the single-urn control, 8 out of 37 subjects (21.6%) with monotone
and transitive choices strictly preferred One to Same, while in the two-urn
treatment 34 out of 75 subjects (45.3%) with monotone and transitive choices
exhibited this pattern. This di¤erence is signicant at 5% (p-value of one-
sided Z test is 0.00731).
In summary, the two control treatments indicate that although a bet on
one urn is simpler and also may be attractive relative to the bets Same and
Diff for subjects who do not reduce compound objective lotteries, its appeal
is signicantly strengthened when the relation between the compositions of
the urns is ambiguous.
A.2.2 Probabilistic sophistication
We now discuss the distribution of choices in the two behaviorsEllsbergs
two-urn classic problem and One vs Twothat tested probabilistic sophisti-
cation. We restrict to subjects who did not exhibit strict color preference.32
Although strict color preference does not necessarily imply non-symmetric
beliefs, (even some subjects in the risk control exhibited this behavior), we
decided to err on the side of caution and excluded such subjects when calcu-
lating adherence to probabilistic sophistication. Results including the other
subjects are reported in Appendix A.2.5.
Ellsbergian ambiguity (2013-2014)
Out of 111 subjects, almost 60% (66 subjects) exhibited strict Ellsbergian
31p-value of one-sided Fisher exact test is 0.012.
32The fraction of subjects who exhibited strict color preference in the single ambiguous
urn control is similar (9 out of 39 subjects) and is lower in the risk control (6 out of 44
subjects).
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One vs Two 2013 2014
# % # %
One  Two (nonPS) 23 41.1 18 32.7
Two  One (nonPS) 4 7.1 6 10.9
One  Two 20 35.7 26 47.3
non-symmetric beliefs (PS) 9 16.1 5 9.1
Total 56 100 55 100
Table A.2: One vs Two: 2013-2014
ambiguity aversion when asked to choose between betting on a red draw
from the risky urn (with probability 0.5 of winning) and betting on a chosen
color from one of the urns with unknown composition. Almost 37% (41
subjects) chose in a way that does not reveal ambiguity aversion or seeking,
and the remaining 4 subjects exhibited ambiguity seeking. That is, about
63% of the subjects were not probabilistically sophisticated in a standard
Ellsberg experiment. This proportion is consistent with existing studies that
use certainty equivalent elicitation or choice data.33
One versus Two (2013-2014)
There were 41 subjects (37% of 111 subjects) who exhibited OneTwo,
and 10 subjects who exhibited TwoOne (7 of them ambiguity averse in Ells-
berg). These 51 subjects (46% of 111) violated probabilistic sophistication.34
The choices of the remaining 60 subjects (54% of the 111 subjects) can be ra-
tionalized by probabilistic beliefs. 2 subjects exhibited Same  R1  Diff ,
and 12 subjects exhibited Diff  R1  Same (11 of the latter exhibited
Ellsbergian ambiguity aversion).
Combining both the Ellsberg and One vs Two choice problems, we nd
that only 27 out of the 111 subjects made choices that are consistent with
probabilistic beliefs. That is, more than 75% were not probabilistically so-
phisticated in at least one of the choices.
33Note that 41 is an upper bound on the number of ambiguity neutral subjectsthe
proportion of ambiguity neutral subjects may be even smaller since the increment of $1
used in the experiment to detect strict preference may have been too big for some subjects.
34Remember that we restricted the sample to subjects who agreed with the symmetry
statements in the rst experiment and were consistent with color symmetry in the second
experiment.
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Ellsbergian One vs Two Total
Ambiguity nonPS Symmetric PS non-symmetric PS
nonPS 20 20 23 63
PS 15 40 11 66
Total 35 60 34 129
Fisher exact test p-value=0.003
Table A.3: Ellsbergian ambiguity and One vs Two: Pairwise Choices (2015)
A.2.3 Relation between attitude to sources of ambiguity
2015
Tables A.3 and A.4 summarize the association between attitude to Ells-
bergian ambiguity and choices made in One vs Two in the two elicitation
methods. Each cell counts the number of subjects who exhibit the prole of
behaviors.
The rows in both tables correspond to probabilistically sophisticated be-
havior in the standard Ellsberg experiment, where the top row counts the sub-
jects who are either strictly Ellsbergian ambiguity averse or seeking (nonPS),
while the second row counts all the rest (PS).
The columns correspond to probabilistic sophistication in One vs Two.
The leftmost column corresponds to subjects who are not probabilistically
sophisticated (nonPS, exhibiting either OneTwo or TwoOne). The other
columns include subjects that made choices consistent with probabilistic so-
phistication. The middle column in Table A.3 includes only subjects who
did not exhibit any strict preference in One vs Two, while the right column
includes probabilistically sophisticated subjects who chose at least one bet
with a lower prize (and hence revealed strict preference) in One vs Two.
Fisher exact test for association reveals a tight association between behav-
iors in the two problems, but it is important to note that it is not that
failure of probabilistic sophistication in one problem is associated with simi-
lar behavior in the other problem (this e¤ect is not signicant here); rather,
probabilistically sophisticated behavior in the Ellsberg problem is associated
with symmetric probabilistically sophisticated behavior in the One vs Two.
In other words: subjects who always chose the bet with the higher prize in
one problem tended to do the same in the other problem as well.
Table A.4 presents the association based on choice list elicitation. Since
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Ellsbergian One vs Two Total
Ambiguity nonPS PS
nonPS 28 12 40
PS 15 19 34
Total 43 31 74
Fisher exact test p-value=0.034
Table A.4: Ellsbergian ambiguity and One vs Two from Choice Lists (2015)
Ellsbergian One vs Two Total
Ambiguity nonPS Symmetric PS non-symmetric PS
nonPS 37 20 13 70
PS 14 26 1 41
Total 51 46 14 111
Fisher exact test p-value<0.00011
1 p-values of Fisher exact tests in the 2013 and 2014 experiments (separately) are 0.008
and 0.113, respectively.
Table A.5: Ellsbergian ambiguity and One vs Two in 2013-2014 experiments
the tendency to make probabilistically sophisticated non-symmetric choices
in One vs Two is much lower, we can combine the two probabilistically so-
phisticated columns. Here we nd that failure of probabilistic sophistication
in Ellsberg is signicantly associated with (but distinct from) violation of
probabilistic sophistication in One vs Two.
2013-2014
As in 2015, when distinguishing between forms of probabilistic sophistica-
tion in One vs Two the association is signicant, but when pooling the two
forms of probabilistic sophisticated behavior the association is less strong
(one sided p-value=0.043).
When pooling all 240 subjects (2013-2015) who participated in the pair-
wise choice experiment, the association between probabilistic sophisticated
behavior in the two domains is signicant (one side p-value = 0.008), but the
behaviors are far from being identical.
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A.2.4 RIS and hedging
As discussed earlier, the standard use of RIS in ambiguity experiments (where
the selection of the choice problem that counts for payment is performed
after choices have been made and balls have been drawn) is open to the
criticism that it could provide the subject with an opportunity to hedge the
uncertainty using the randomization device employed in the incentive sys-
tem. This implementation of the RIS induces a choice problem in which the
subject faces Anscombe-Aumann acts and thus where she can hedge ambi-
guity using the randomization device employed in the incentive system by
choosing certain combinations of ambiguous bets.35 For this reason we per-
formed the randomization before subjects made their choices and the draws
from the urns were made. It is an empirical question whether subjects con-
formed with this order when evaluating lotteries, and if they did not, whether
they hedged. These aspects of our experimental design as well as the em-
pirical question whether there is evidence that subjects hedged in spite of
our theoretically incentive compatible implementation are discussed in this
Appendix.
Hedging might be revealed in di¤erent ways. For example, consider the
two choices comprising One vs Two (in 2013-2014), and suppose, for simplic-
ity, that the individual attaches probability 1=2 to payo¤s being dependent
on each of these questions. Then, a subject who is ambiguity averse and
acts as if the randomization occurs after the balls are drawn, could choose
Same over R1 in one question and Diff over R1 in another, and be left with
the same state-independent payo¤ (in expected utility units) that she would
obtain from betting on drawing red from Ellsbergs risky urn. Accordingly, if
she is ambiguity averse in the Ellsberg problem, then the preceding combined
choices would be preferable to R1 and we would observe TwoOne. However
the latter is observed for only 15 subjects (6.25% of subjects) in the three
experiments (2013, 2014 and 2015).
Another possibility for hedging that existed only in 2015 was to make
35The signicance we are attaching to when the randomization takes place runs counter
to Anscombe and Aumanns well-known reversal of order axiom.However, the descrip-
tive appeal of that axiom has been put into question by evidence that subjects who are
ambiguity sensitive usually do not satisfy the reduction of compound lotteries assump-
tion (Halevy 2007; Abdellaoui, Klibano¤ and Pacido 2015; Chew, Miao and Zhong, 2017;
Dean and Ortoleva 2016; Gillen, Snowberg and Yariv 2016). In a more normative vein,
Seo (2009) argues for a relaxation of the reversal of orderaxiom and shows how it can
be part of an axiomatic characterization of the smooth ambiguity model.
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choices consistent with OneTwo (choose R1 and B1). This possibility was
not available to subjects in the 2013-2014 experiments, where they were asked
to choose a color to bet on in advance. The fact that the frequency of Ellsber-
gian ambiguity averse subjects making choices consistent with OneTwo in
2013-2014 is almost three times higher than in 2015 (28/111 compared with
12/129) suggests that this cannot be a major concern in our experiment.
Similarly, in the questions that compare Same to Diff directly (in 2013-
2014), hedging would imply the absence of a strict preference between Same
and Diff . This follows since if the subject had perceived the problem as
if the randomization used for incentives occurred after the balls are drawn
from the urns, then choosing the bet with a prize of $51 ($101 in the 2013
experiment) in each of the two questions would leave the subject with a
lottery that pays $51 ($101) with probability 1=2 independently of the state,
thus completely hedging the ambiguity. However, empirically about 36%
of the subjects exhibit a strict preference in these questions,36 and close to
half (about 49%) of the subjects who are ambiguity sensitive in the Ellsberg
choice problem (and thus may wish to hedge), made choices inconsistent with
indi¤erence between Same and Diff:
We conclude that we do not nd convincing empirical evidence that sub-
jects used the RIS to hedge any source of ambiguity in our experiment.
A.2.5 Weaker inclusion criteria (2013-2014)
Throughout the paper we excluded subjects who made choices that were
not consistent with transitive and monotone preferences in one of the choice
problem. In 2013-2014 we also excluded subjects who did not agree with the
symmetry statements (2013) or exhibited strict preference to betting on one
of the colors.37 The number of subjects excluded decreased as we progressed,
since the instructions they received improved. Footnote 9 in the paper details
the 24 subjects excluded in 2015, and below we describe the subjects excluded
from the analysis of the previous two experiments. In this Appendix we show
that their inclusion does not substantially a¤ect our conclusions.
As noted above, out of 80 subjects who participated in the 2013 experi-
ment, 24 were removed from the analysis: 11 were removed due to violations
of monotonicity or transitivity in at least one pair of questions, 7 due to
367 subjects strictly preferred Same, 33 subjects strictly preferred Diff , and the re-
maining 71 subjects made choices consistent with indi¤erence between Same and Diff .
37This is not a necessary assumption in the 2015 experiment.
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Ellsbergian Ambiguity Attitude 2013 2014
# % # %
strictly averse (nonPS) 51 68.9 45 52.9
strictly seeking (nonPS) 6 8.1 3 3.5
neutral (PS) 17 23 37 43.6
Total 74 100 85 100
Table A.6: Ellsbergian ambiguity attitude 2013-2014: maximal inclusion
One vs Two 2013 2014
# % # %
One  Two (nonPS) 31 40.2 30 38.5
Two  One (nonPS) 6 7.8 10 12.8
One  Two 25 32.5 28 35.9
non-symmetric beliefs (PS) 15 19.5 10 12.8
Total 77 100 78 100
Table A.7: One vs Two 2013-2014: maximal inclusion
cyclic choices between R1, Same and Diff , 4 for disagreeing with the sym-
metry over colors and urns, and two more subjects in the rst session were
caught cheating and their choices were excluded from the analysis. Out of
87 subjects who participated in the main treatment of the 2014 experiment,
75 had no monotonicity or transitivity violations and 20 showed strict color
preference.
In order to include as many subjects as possible from the 2013 experiment,
several relaxations of the inclusion criteria were employed. First, the answer
to the non-incentivized question concerning symmetry was ignored. Second,
in case of cyclic choices between R1, Same and Diff , the direct comparison
between Same and Diff was not taken to invalidate the choices made in
One vs Two (which relies on comparing R1 to Same and R1 to Diff).
Third, if a subject had non-monotone choices in only one pair of questions
(assuming transitivity), (s)he was not removed from the analysis. Instead,
choices in other questions, together with transitivity, were used in order to
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extend the preferences to the suspect direct comparison.38 ;39 We used the
rst two methods for the 2014 experiment as well. The distributions of
Ellsbergian ambiguity and One vs Two are presented in Tables A.6 and A.7.
The marginal distributions of ambiguity attitude expressed in the stan-
dard Ellsberg experiment and in One vs Two are remarkably similar to those
for the smaller sample, taking into account that the bigger sample includes
subjects with non-symmetric color preference, which may a¤ect the choices
that comprised ambiguity attitude (seeking) and OneTwo.
A.3 Details for the source model
This appendix provides supporting details for the model in Section 5.2.
To dene utility precisely, let u1, u2 and u3 be strictly increasing vNM
indices that will apply to the three issues respectively. Let the cdf F describe
conditional beliefs about p, generalizing from the uniform distribution in
Figure 5.1. Then, for any bet (or act) f over S1S2, its utility (in certainty
equivalent units) is computed recursively by:40
U (f) = u 11 (u1(V2 (f)) + (1  )u1(W2 (f))) ,
V2 (f) = u
 1
2
Z
p
u2 (V3 (f ; p)) dF

, W2 (f) = u 12
Z
p
u2 (W3 (f ; p)) dF

,
V3 (f ; p) = u
 1
3
Z
S1S2
u3 (f) d [(p; 1  p)
 (p; 1  p)]

, and
W3 (f ; p) = u
 1
3
Z
S1S2
u3 (f) d [(p; 1  p)
 (1  p; p)]

.
38This applies to 5 subjects. An extreme example is provided by Subject 315: (s)he did
not agree with the suggested symmetry in colors and urns, and her/his choices in R1 vs
Same were inconsistent with monotone preferences. However, the choices in R1 vs Diff
and Diff vs Same were consistent with R1  Diff and Diff  Same; so this subject
was classied as exhibiting One  Two.
39We omitted only the two subjects who were caught cheating and another subject
who made choices inconsistent with monotone preferences in both R1 vs Same and R1 vs
Diff .
40Symmetry in urns is built into the model, and symmetry in colors is implied if we
assume, as we do, that F is suitably symmetric (the compositions (p; 1  p) and (1  p; p)
are equally likely).
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Now specialize to uniform F ,  = 1
2
and linear u3, with u3 (x) = 1 and
u3 (0) = 0. Then the utility of the bet R3 on drawing red from the risky
Ellsberg urn is given by
U (R3) = u
 1
3
 
1
2

= 1
2
,
and the utility of the bet R1 on drawing red from a single ambiguous urn is
U (R1) = u
 1
2
Z
p
u2 (p) dF

.
Thus R3 is preferred if u2 is concave, as noted in the text. Moreover,
OneTwo is implied if u1 is more concave than u2:
u1  U (Same) = 12u1  u 12

2
3
u2 (1) +
1
3
u2
 
1
2

+ 1
2
u1  u 12

2
3
u2 (0) +
1
3
u2
 
1
2

 u1  u 12

1
2
 
2
3
u2 (1) +
1
3
u2
 
1
2

+ 1
2
 
2
3
u2 (0) +
1
3
u2
 
1
2

= u1  u 12

1
3
u2 (0) +
1
3
u2
 
1
2

+ 1
3
u2 (1)

= u1  U (R1) .
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